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This increased focus on accountability prompted the writing of this paper. Several months of research have convinced this writer that the new emphasis on accountability, when combined with proper dissemination of information, will make the Air Force a better organization.
Like any difficult and arduous task, this paper is the result of many who helped and guided me along the way over the last several months. A special thanks to my advisor, Moving to the heart of the paper, three high profile incidents, which address the application of accountability, are analyzed: an F-15C crash, which resulted in charging two NCOs with negligent homicide; the Khobar Tower bombing, a case in which the accountability issue is still pending; and the CT-43 mishap, a case in which several people in the chain of command were held accountable. The paper will end with a conclusion and several recommendations.
Introduction
We depend on our commanders and supervisors to insure that their people meet the high standards of our profession. When they fail, when they don't measure up, then we must hold them accountable.
-General Ronald Fogleman
Chief of Staff, USAF "Accountability," has become the Air Force buzz word of the 90s. Today's Air Force leaders are told that when they "fail," when they do not "measure up," they will be held accountable. 1 This approach to accountability is not novel; rather, it is a rich and integral part of our military tradition. From the time of General George Washington and the Continental Army, accountability has been one of the touchstones of U.S. military leadership and command. However, increased emphasis, fueled by events such as the Black Hawk shoot down, and Khobar Tower bombing, is new and has led some to contend that the accountability pendulum has swung too far.
These high profile incidents have focused the attention of the public and senior Air Force definition of accountability, has, in some instances, blurred the lines between the concepts of individual liability, accountability, and responsibility. This blurring of the lines has led some to believe that they will be unfairly punished for the improper actions of others. Consequently, many of the surveyed officers misunderstand the renewed emphasis on accountability and view it as "a senior officer (0-6 and above) witch hunt!" 2 The truth is the term accountability is not clearly defined, nor has Air Force senior leadership adequately explained the concept.
These findings and observations lead to the thesis of this paper:
Failure by senior Air Force leadership to adequately define, explain, or standardize the concept of accountability has created the perception that the application of accountability is inconsistent, situation dependent, and subjective. This perception creates the negative appearance of a double standard and a "one mistake" Air Force. In the end, when Commander Friendly is relieved of command and Lt. Knot is sent off to jail, it is likely that the public's perception of what happen will be shaped by a story sensationalized in the media, while the Air Force will remain essentially silent (for legal and other reasons). A lack of dissemination of key facts by Air Force senior leadership creates an environment where it appears that the application of accountability is inconsistent, situation dependent, and subjective. This perception undermines the intent of why the Air Force Chief of Staff increased emphasis on accountability.
Why the increased emphasis on accountability?
The purpose of increased emphasis on accountability, according to General Fogleman, is to "ensure good order and discipline." But more important, it is to ensure "Air Force standards are uniformly known, consistently applied and non-selectively enforced." 6 This increased emphasis on accountability can likely be traced to April 14, 1994 , when two Air Force F-15s, under the command and control of an AWACS aircraft, staffed by a U.S. Air
Force crew, engaged and destroyed two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters. Twenty-six soldiers, airmen, and civilians were killed and no action was taken against the pilots involved. 7 .
Apparently not satisfied with the "disconnects between the administrative actions and performance ratings" 8 of individuals involved in the Black Hawk incident, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman initiated the renewed emphasis on accountability.
In a videotaped statement that was made mandatory viewing for all officers, General
Fogleman outlined the importance of accountability in these terms:
Accountability is critically important to good order and discipline of the force. And, failure to ensure accountability will destroy the trust of the American public-the very people living under the Constitution we swore to support and defend, and who look to us, the members of their nation's Air Force, to embrace and live by the standards that are higher than those in the society we serve. 9 Most commanders would take pleasure in knowing that the Air Force Chief of Staff is pursuing uniform Air Force standards, that are consistently applied and non-selectively
enforced. Yet, according to a student survey on command accountability, many officers misunderstand the increased emphasis on accountability because the perception is that accountability is an inconsistent, situation dependent, and subjective concept. 4 Colonel William Scott, USAF, Commandant, Squadron Officer School, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 12 February 1997. 5 Henry Campbell Black, M.A., "Black's Law Dictionary," Revised Fourth Edition. 6 General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, Air Force Standards and Accountability, 10 August 1995. 1 -8. 7 "Critics say military looks other way on disciplining its own," San Antonio ExpressNews, 25 December 1996. 8 Air Force Standards and Accountability, 10 August 1995. 1 -8. 9 Ibid.
Notes

Commander Accountability Survey Purpose
The survey analyzes and assesses the current accountability environment as viewed by active duty Air Force officers, ranging in rank from captain to colonel. The representative pool was taken from those officers attending an in-resident professional military education (PME) program.
Survey Size
Four hundred and forty-one surveys were distributed to active duty Air Force AWC, ACSC, and SOS students. One hundred and seventy surveys were distributed to AWC students, one hundred and thirty were distributed to ACSC students, and one hundred and forty surveys were distributed to SOS students. A total of three hundred and twenty-eight surveys were returned. One hundred and four individuals completed surveys from AWC, one hundred and six individuals, from ACSC, and one hundred and eighteen individuals, from SOS.
Methodology
Using a sliding scale ( strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree and strongly disagree) each officer surveyed responded to the statements in figures 1-6. In addition, each officer surveyed was encouraged to make candid comments on the survey sheet.
Results
Whereas the student survey data on accountability identified no specific trends, it did provide a wide range of opinions on commander accountability. The data in figures [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] has been simplified and each graph will only show agree (A), disagree (DA), and undecided (UND). The agree column represents both strongly agree and agree and the disagree column represents both strongly disagree and disagree. A survey 
Figure 1
Accountability should be placed at the level where the individual had the responsibility and authority to execute the mission.
Taking command of a squadron is the highlight of an officer's career. Forever vivid in each officer's memory are the words, "I accept the command." However, with these words come increased responsibility for your actions and the actions of subordinates.
Fifty-seven percent of the SOS students surveyed agreed with statement 1. However, sixty-four percent of AWC and sixty-two percent of the ACSC students surveyed disagreed with statement 1.
Seasoned senior officers better comprehend the realistic and operational dynamics of command. They understand that despite their best effort, they cannot monitor everything and everyone. On the other hand, junior officers who have yet to experience the weight of command, appear to have an idealized view of a commander's ability to influence his or her subordinates' actions. Only weak commanders will resort to micro-management to "protect" themselves against accountability. Unfortunately, the AF has many weak commanders.
-AWC Student Survey Comment
According to fifty-six percent of AWC and fifty percent of ACSC students surveyed, current Air Force accountability emphasis will cause commanders to become micromanagers. Survey data indicates thirty-two percent of SOS students agree with statement 4 with a significant number, twenty-six percent, undecided,. This is not a one-mistake Air Force. We fully realize that our people are going to make honest mistakes as they attempt to perform their duties. That's an understandable part of the process of gaining experience.
-General Ronald Fogleman Chief of Staff, USAF
In his speech on standards and accountability, the Air Force Chief of Staff attempted
to distinguish between what is considered a crime and what is considered a mistake. The majority of officers surveyed consistently agree that we serve in a one mistake Air Force.
The truth is some "mistakes," no matter how innocent, have consequences. In addition, if an individual continues to make mistakes, even small mistakes, can and will adversely affect a career.
A related question is can we accurately differentiate between a mistake and a crime and was the commander justified in charging two NCOs with negligent homicide after they performed maintenance on an F-15C that subsequently crashed, killing the pilot?
Notes
F-15C Crash
What Happened? Both individuals were taught in their initial flight control training that the rods could be crossed at the mixer assembly and an operational check was required and extremely important. TSgt Campbell also learned of the possibility of crossed rods during maintenance for the mixer assembly when all F-15C mechanics were briefed on a similar previous incident in 1991 and the need for extreme care and adherence to the technical orders. In 1991 TSgt Mueller received the message concerning the 1991 incident and was responsible for disseminating the information to the wing; his supervisor ordered TSgt Mueller to insure all members of the wing were aware of the problem; and he was ordered to make sure he developed an In-Progress Inspection as well as an operational inspection. Additionally, the technical order contained a conspicuous warning that failure to correctly install would lead to aircraft destruction and loss of life. An operational check-out by both TSgt Mueller and Campbell was also required. Both were specially trained to accomplish this task. An InProgress-Inspection was due prior to closing up the aircraft and before they did the operational check. In fairness to Mueller and Campbell, the pilot and crew chief also had a duty to check the proper movement of the aircraft's flight control rods before take off. According to a F-15 pilot, the pilot and crew chief must verify that all "stick" movement is correct prior to take off. For example, the "crew chief and pilot must both visually inspect the aircraft as the pilot maneuvers the stick, verifying the correct response."
An earlier High-Accident-Potential (HAP) report indicated that F-15 rods could easily be "connected to the wrong receptacle at the mixer end" and, as crash investigators were to discover in tests, "the mistake is surprisingly easy to make: Only the rod's ends are visible to mechanics as they connect them through two open panels on the jet, and they connected just as easily when correctly installed as when they are crossed." 7 However, the F-15 maintainer's technical order contained a conspicuous warning that "failure to correctly install [flight control rods] would lead to aircraft destruction and loss of life." 8 The same Air Force Times article, alleges there was a secret Air Force investigation, in which the F-15 program office determined that "a cross-connection [of flight-control rods] would be caught" by the mechanics or the pilot before a plane could take off" 9 Moreover, according to the article, one unidentified Air Force official, in a handwritten memo stated, "[w]e ought to fix it so they can't be connected wrong." 10 Situations such as the one described above foster the perception of a double standard because commanders may interpret accountability different and Air Force senior leadership does not disseminate its side of the story to the public or the Air Force community.
Placing the blame solely on the mechanic's duty to inspect, Major General Charles
Heflebower, who commanded all U.S. Air Force Bases in Germany, charged each mechanic with one count of negligent homicide and four counts of dereliction of duty. On the day Mueller's court martial on these charges was to begin, he shot himself. Campbell subsequently accepted a general discharge in exchange for dismissal of the charges against him. 11 As a result, we will never know what decision a court martial board would have reached.
However, "Heflebower's decision to charge the two mechanics with negligent homicide was viewed by many as especially harsh," indicating the "accountability pendulum has swung too far." 12 Mainstream media never reported that the mechanics were aware of the potential for crossing the rods nor that they failed to properly complete the maintenance checklist. What was reported and read by military members was that the "F-15 program office had known for 10 years that flight control rods on F-15s could be cross-connected. Despite this knowledge, "officials failed to warn mechanics in technical manuals or training courses." 13 We must accept that when incidents occur, the Air Force becomes the focus of media attention. When this happens, mainstream media becomes the primary source of information for military members. This information provides the basis of the opinions formed by many military members. When the information is incorrect and remains unchallenged by the Air Force, it undermines faith in the system. It becomes more difficult to support the actions of the commander and chips away at the concept of "service above self" which is a core value. 
Chapter 5 Khobar Towers Bombing
The determination of accountability is unquestionably subjective. Yet, General
Fogleman has said "when people fail, when they make mistakes, they must be held accountable." 
Was the decision correct?
If the Downing report is to be accepted at face value, the decision by Air Force senior leadership to not hold Brigadier General Schwailer accountable for the deaths of nineteen American servicemen and the loss of resources was incorrect.
General Wayne A. Downing, General, USA (Ret.) was selected to head a Task Force following the bomb attack on Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 3 . This 40-man Pentagon task force was highly critical of the military leaders, noting their failure to provide clear standards, adequate funding and proper attention to protect U.S. forces against a recognized terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia. 4 Also, Downing found that some of the same issues raised by his task force, for example, the inadequacy of human-source intelligence, were also cited by investigators following the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut that killed 241.
5
In both cases, military members were found to be or cited as being responsible for the security failures which resulted in the deaths of American servicemen, yet no military member was held accountable. In the Beirut incident, President Reagan accepted responsibility for the disaster 6 and in the Khobar Towers incident, Secretary of Defense Perry accepted responsibility for the disaster. 7 The Downing Report indicated that Schwalier did not make terrorism a top priority;
did not make his superiors aware of force protection matters beyond his capability to correct; and never raised the issue with his Saudi counterparts of expanding the perimeter or security outside of the fence 8 . Furthermore, according to Downing, security is pretty much left to the base commander. A vulnerability assessment of Khobar Towers distributed five months before the attack noted that windows throughout the complex were "untreated" and were "not protected from a blast." 9 Despite this report, Schwalier apparently deferred a budget request for protective "mylar film" for windows to prevent the shattering of glass. Twelve of the 19 people killed at the Khobar Towers died from flying glass. In addition, Khobar Towers was identified to Schwalier as one of the three highest priority soft targets in the region 10 .
In the end, the Downing Report only singled Schwalier out, by name, as bearing some blame for the Khobar Towers bombing. For example, according to the report, Schwalier failed to heed warnings of a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran. The Downing report went on to say, whereas Schwalier did a "reasonable" job in increasing security inside of the complex, he did not do enough to increase, security outside the gates," or enough to convince the Saudis, who were responsible for security on the outside of the perimeter, to do more towards increasing security 11 . Commander responsibility demands a level of accountability which far exceeds that of civilian counterparts, it requires us to adhere to "standards that are higher than those in the society we serve." Stevens was punished "for dereliction of duty for negligently failing to ensure" that government directives had been followed in reviews of airport safety under his command.
Mazurowski was penalized for "dereliction of duty for willfully failing to ensure" that the same directives had been followed 2 .
Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Cliver, former director of operations for U.S. Air Forces in Europe, was faulted for "failing to exercise effective oversight" over his organization. No criminal charges were preferred against any officer involved. safety. This was not the commander's decision to make because higher headquarters had already specially been asked for a waiver to fly the approaches and it had been denied.. 8 Thus, the 86 th AW Commander exceeded his authority by authorizing his crews to fly a non-DOD approach at Dubrovnik, Croatia. To make matters worse, the crew made a series of critical mistakes when flying the approach.
The aircrew made four critical errors, all of which were determined to be contributory causes of the mishap. First, the aircrew improperly planned the mission which added 15 minutes to their flight time. As a direct result of this improper planning, they failed to realize that they did not have the proper equipment to land at Dubrovnik 9 . Second, the aircrew improperly planned the flight and was late arriving at Dubrovnik. As a result, they rushed the landing approach and failed to properly configure the aircraft. 10 Third, the aircrew failed to monitor their final approach due to a rush to land, radio distraction at Dubrovnik and an improperly configured aircraft. Fourth and most important, in the opinion of the accident board president, the aircrew "failed to identify their missed approach point and execute a missed approach." According to the investigation board president, "if the pilots had not been able to see the runway and descend for a landing, they should have executed a missed approach no later than the missed approach point." 
Notes Conclusion
Accountability, appears to be the leadership watch word of the future. Therefore, the manner in which senior Air Force leadership defines it, will shape how commanders, supervisors and individuals apply accountability standards in future cases.
Failure by senior Air Force leadership to adequately define, explain or uniformly apply accountability standards will continue to fuel the perception that accountability is an inconsistent, situation dependent and subjective concept. Such a perception reinforce the negative appearance of a "double standard" and a "one mistake" Air Force.
Air Force senior leadership must do two things to correct the negative appearance of a "double standard" and "one mistake" Air Force. First, be as aggressive as legal restriction allow in rebutting the incredible amount of incorrect and partial information about high profile incidents appearing in the Air Force Times and other non-DOD publications. Second, develop a standard Air Force definition of accountability, along with an accountability Air Force Instruction (AFI), that eliminates as much as possible, the subjectivity that will always be present when determining accountability.
Current problems associated with accountability parallel those previously experienced with the lack of a standard Air Force definition for fraternization and a fraternization AFI.
Prior to development of a standard definition of fraternization and an accompanying AFI, fraternization enforcement was inconsistent, situation dependent and subjective.
Every high profile incident examined is different. Yet, it is the responsibility of Air
Force senior leadership to apply consist standards. When one has access to all the facts, it is clear Air Force senior leadership is attempting to do so. Yet it is very difficult to get access to the facts. This, unfortunately, in each one of the incidents is true, most Air Force members rely on the Air Force Times or some other non-DOD publication for their source of information. A proposed definition is:
Recommendations
Accountability means you are responsible for all your actions and the actions of the people you command which you could have reasonably influenced.
N Air Force senior leadership must develop an accountability AFI.
N The AFI must address the chain of accountability, which is often overlooked.
In other words, ensure the entire chain of command is reviewed for breaches of duty when accountability is an issue. For example, were only two NCOs accountable for the F-15C crash?
N The AFI must include a decision review process model. Application of this process model would alleviate the perception that the new emphasis on accountability has turned into an "0-6 witch-hunt," or that some careers are sacrificed for the benefit of others.
N The AFI should provide accountability examples similar to the ones used for sexual harassment training.
N Perhaps these recommendations will help us reach the point when accountability serves its stated purpose:
Accountability is critically important to good order and discipline of the force. And, failure to ensure accountability will destroy the trust of the American public-the very people living under the Constitution we swore to support and defend, and who look to us, the members of their nation's Air Force, to embrace and live by the standards that are higher than those in the society we serve 1 .
Notes
1 Air Force Standards and Accountability, 10 August 1995. 1 -8. 
